Term: 2006
Docket: 05-11284
Jalil Abdul-kabir, Fka Ted Calvin Cole v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department Of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
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05-11284 ABDUL-KABIR V. QUARTERMAN DECISION BELOW:418 F3D 494 CONSOLIDATED WITH 05-11287 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT CERT. GRANTED 10/13/2006 QUESTIONS PRESENTED: 1. Do the former Texas “special issue” capital sentencing jury instructions — which permit jurors to register only a “yes” or “no” answer to two questions, inquiring whether the defendant killed “deliberately” and probably would constitute a “continuing threat to society” — permit constitutionally adequate consideration of mitigating evidence about a defendant’s mental impairment and childhood mistreatment and deprivation, in light of this Court’s emphatic statement in Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004), that those same two questions “had little, if anything, to do with” Smith’s evidence of mental impairment and childhood mistreatment)? 2. Do this Court’s recent opinions in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (“Penry II”) and Smith, both of which require instructions that permit jurors to give “full consideration and full effect” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence in choosing the appropriate sentence, preclude the Fifth Circuit from adhering to its prior decisions — antedating Penry II and Smith — that reject Penry error whenever the former special issues might have afforded some indirect consideration of the defendant’s mitigating evidence? 3. Has the Fifth Circuit, in insisting that a defendant show as a predicate to relief under Penry that he suffers from a mental disorder that is severe, permanent or untreatable, simply resurrected the threshold test for “constitutional relevance” that this Court emphatically rejected in Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)? 4. Where the prosecution, as it did here, repeatedly implores jurors to “follow the law” and “do their duty” by answering the former Texas special issues on their own terms and abjuring any attempt to use their answers to effect an appropriate sentence, is it reasonably likely that jurors applied their instructions in a way that prevented them from fully considering and giving effect to the defendant’s mitigating evidence? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 01-10646
The U.S. Supreme Court case Jalil Abdul-Kabir v. Nathaniel Quarterman, 2006, revolved around the issue of whether a Texas court had violated the defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by not allowing mitigating evidence to be considered during his sentencing for capital murder. The petitioner, Jalil Abdul-Kabir (formerly known as Ted Calvin Cole), argued that he was denied a fair trial because jurors were unable to fully consider his troubled background and mental health issues when deciding on his death sentence. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Abdul-Kabir in a 5-4 decision stating that under previous precedents set by cases like Penry v Lynaugh (1989) and Eddings v Oklahoma (1982), juries should have been able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence before imposing the death penalty.
In the dissenting opinion for Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established precedent. They contended that it ignored previous rulings which held that jurors do not need to be explicitly instructed on mitigating evidence in capital cases unless there is ambiguity about whether they can consider such evidence. The dissenters believed this case did not present any ambiguity as Texas law allowed jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence through their consideration of future dangerousness and moral culpability questions. Furthermore, they criticized the majority for applying an analysis retroactively when it had been rejected at the time of petitioner’s trial and direct appeal – thus violating principles of finality and federalism.
