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In Stephen v. R. Ableman, the Supreme Court considered whether a federal court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus in order to free an individual who was being held in custody under state law for violating the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. The plaintiff argued that since he was being held by state authorities and not federal ones, it was beyond the power of a federal court to intervene and grant him relief from his imprisonment. However, Chief Justice Taney disagreed with this argument and ruled that because Congress had passed legislation granting authority over fugitive slaves to both state and federal courts, then any case involving such matters could be heard by either one depending on which forum would provide more favorable results for those involved. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that Stephen's arrest did indeed violate his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution and granted him release from prison via habeas corpus proceedings issued through a United States Circuit Court judge.
In Stephen v. R. Ableman, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether a federal court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus in order to release an individual from state custody for alleged violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. The majority opinion held that such power did not exist and thus denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. In dissent, Justice Curtis argued that Congress had clearly intended to grant federal courts this authority when it passed the Fugitive Slave Act and therefore they should have been allowed to exercise their jurisdiction over this case. He further noted that if Congress wanted otherwise then it could pass legislation specifically limiting or denying such powers but until then he believed there was no legal basis on which to deny Stephen's request for relief from his unlawful detention under state law enforcement officials acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute - namely, the Fugitive Slave Act itself.