Adams v. Crittenden was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The case arose when the petitioner, John Adams, was arrested by federal officers in the state of Kentucky and held in federal custody. Adams sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, arguing that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the federal government had the power to protect the rights of individuals held in federal custody. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the federal government had the power to protect the rights of individuals held in federal custody.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Adams v. Crittenden, arguing that the majority had erred in their interpretation of a contract between two parties. The contract was for an exchange of land and money, with one party agreeing to pay $2,000 for certain real estate owned by the other party. Justice Field argued that under California law at the time, which governed this case as it arose from a dispute within California's borders, there were three possible interpretations of this agreement: either both parties intended to be bound immediately upon signing; or they intended to be bound only after some further action on behalf of both parties; or they did not intend any binding obligation until all conditions were fulfilled by each side. In his dissent he argued that since no evidence had been presented regarding what either party actually intended when entering into this agreement - such as whether there was any intention to bind themselves immediately - then it should have been up to a jury trial rather than decided summarily by the court itself without hearing testimony from witnesses who could provide insight into how these two individuals understood their own contractual obligations. He concluded that because no such evidence existed here and thus could not be considered by a jury trial before judgment was rendered against one side or another, summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of either plaintiff nor defendant but instead remanded back down for further proceedings so as to allow proper consideration given all relevant facts surrounding this particular case.