Alvord v. United States was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a defendant could be convicted of a crime if the indictment was not found by a grand jury. The case involved a man named Alvord who was charged with a crime in the District of Columbia. The indictment was not found by a grand jury, but rather by a single judge. Alvord argued that this violated the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not require a grand jury indictment in the District of Columbia. The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment only applied to the federal government, and the District of Columbia was not part of the federal government. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the District of Columbia and the indictment was valid. The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment did not require a grand jury indictment in the District of Columbia because the District of Columbia was not a state. The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment only applied to the states, and the District of Columbia was not a state. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the District of Columbia and the indictment was valid. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not require a grand jury indictment in the District of Columbia. The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment only applied to the federal government and the states, and the District of Columbia was neither. Therefore, the indictment was valid and Alvord was convicted of the crime.

In the case of Alvord v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a defendant's right to be present in court during trial proceedings had been violated when he was removed from the courtroom without being given an opportunity to explain his conduct. The majority opinion held that this did not constitute a violation of due process and that it was within the discretion of the presiding judge. However, Justice Field dissented on this point and argued that removing a defendant from their own trial without allowing them an opportunity for explanation or defense constituted a denial of due process rights under both common law and constitutional principles. He further argued that such removal should only occur after giving notice so as to allow for some form of defense against any charges brought against them by prosecutors or other parties involved in litigation proceedings.