In Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, Attorney-General, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Kansas statute that prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors within four miles of any schoolhouse. The plaintiff, Ames, was a liquor dealer who was convicted of violating the statute. He argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power, and that it was not unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court noted that the statute was intended to protect the health and morals of schoolchildren, and that it was not discriminatory in its application. The Court also held that the statute did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power, and that it was not unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court noted that the statute was intended to protect the health and morals of schoolchildren, and that it was not discriminatory in its application. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within four miles of any schoolhouse did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, Attorney-General, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state law that prohibited the sale of lottery tickets within its borders violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The majority held that it did not violate this clause because Congress had not yet regulated interstate commerce in this area and thus states were free to regulate their own internal affairs as they saw fit. Justice Field dissented from this opinion on two grounds: first, he argued that since lotteries involved both intrastate and interstate commerce, any attempt by a state to prohibit them would be an unconstitutional interference with interstate trade; second, he argued that even if Congress had not yet acted in this area, it could still do so at any time and therefore states should refrain from regulating such activities until then. He concluded his dissent by stating "the power of one State over another is limited only by express prohibitions contained in the Constitution."