In the 1897 case Andersen v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter involving maritime law and salvage rights. The plaintiff, Andersen, was captain of a ship that had assisted another vessel in distress at sea. He claimed his crew's efforts contributed significantly to saving the other ship and its cargo from potential loss or damage. As such, he believed they were entitled to compensation under international salvage laws - regulations designed to encourage seafarers to assist vessels in danger by offering them a portion of the value saved. The defendant, however - representing interests tied with the rescued vessel - argued that while assistance was provided by Andersen's crew, it did not meet criteria for awarding salvage since there wasn't any imminent peril threatening their property when help arrived. After reviewing evidence presented during trial proceedings (including testimonies about weather conditions at time of incident), justices sided with defendants; ruling that although some aid was given by plaintiffs which might have helped prevent possible future harm if circumstances worsened later on – this alone didn’t warrant granting them full-fledged salvor status as per legal standards then applicable because no immediate danger existed when they intervened.

In the dissenting opinion for Andersen v. United States, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was a misinterpretation of the law and an overreach of federal authority. He contended that Congress did not have jurisdiction to regulate oyster fishing in state waters under its commerce powers because this activity is not interstate commerce but rather a purely local matter within each state's control. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s view that oysters were "vessels" under maritime law, arguing instead they are fixed structures on submerged lands owned by states. Thus, according to him, any disputes arising from their use should be resolved by state courts applying local laws rather than federal courts using admiralty jurisdiction. In his view, allowing such broad interpretation would undermine states' rights and upset the balance between federal and state power established by Constitution.