This case involved a dispute between the Receiver of the Philadelphia Warehouse Company and the company itself. The Receiver had been appointed by the court to take possession of the company's assets and to manage them for the benefit of the creditors. The company argued that the Receiver had no authority to sell the assets without the consent of the company's board of directors. The Supreme Court held that the Receiver had the authority to sell the assets without the consent of the board of directors. The Court reasoned that the Receiver was appointed by the court to manage the assets for the benefit of the creditors, and that the board of directors had no authority to interfere with the Receiver's duties. The Court also held that the Receiver had the authority to sell the assets without the consent of the creditors, as long as the sale was made in good faith and for the benefit of the creditors. The Court's decision established that the Receiver had the authority to manage the assets of the company without the consent of the board of directors or the creditors. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and has been used to support the authority of receivers to manage assets without the consent of the parties involved.

In Anderson, Receiver v. Philadelphia Ware-House Company, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a receiver appointed by a court of equity had the authority to bring an action in tort against another party for damages caused by negligence. The majority opinion held that such actions were not within the scope of receivership and thus could not be brought. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that it would lead to injustice as creditors who had suffered losses due to negligent acts would have no recourse under existing law if they sought compensation through their receiver. He argued that allowing receiverships to pursue these types of claims was consistent with prior case law and equitable principles which allowed courts discretion when it came to protecting creditors’ interests in cases where there may be some ambiguity or uncertainty about what remedies are available. Furthermore, he noted that Congress had previously authorized similar suits on behalf of bankrupt estates and thus should also allow them here as well since both situations involve parties seeking redress for wrongs committed against them without any other legal remedy available at hand.