In the case of Rafeh-Rafie Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1991, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a provision in federal law allowing for attorney's fees to be awarded did not apply to deportation proceedings. Ardestani, an Iranian citizen who had been living in the United States since she was a child, faced deportation after being convicted of drug charges. She argued that under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which allows prevailing parties in litigation against government agencies to recover legal costs if they meet certain criteria, she should be able to recoup her legal expenses from her successful challenge against initial deportation order. However, The Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation by ruling 6-3 that EAJA does not cover administrative proceedings such as immigration hearings because they are not considered adversarial adjudications under Section 504(b)(1)(C) of Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Therefore it concluded that Congress did not intend for EAJA’s fee-shifting provisions to apply outside context of civil actions brought by or against United States.

In the dissenting opinion for Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) was too narrow. He contended that Congress intended EAJA to cover all civil actions, including deportation proceedings. The majority’s decision not to award attorney fees in this case contradicted Congressional intent to deter unjustified governmental action by allowing prevailing parties in litigation against government agencies to recover their legal costs. Furthermore, he pointed out that immigration proceedings can be complex and often require expert legal representation; thus denying recovery of attorney fees would disproportionately affect immigrants who may lack resources for adequate defense. In his view, such an interpretation undermines both fairness and access to justice.