Term: 2010
Docket: 09-987
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization, Petitioner v. Kathleen M. Winn Et Al.
- Pro
09-987 AZ CHRISTIAN SCHOOL TUITION ORG. V. WINN DECISION BELOW: 562 F.3d 1002 CONSOLIDATED WITH 09-991 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT CERT. GRANTED 5/24/2010 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Do Respondents lack taxpayer standing because they do not allege, nor can they, that the Arizona Tuition Tax Credit involves the expenditure or appropriation of state funds? 2. Is the Respondents' alleged injury-which is solely based on the theory that Arizona's tax credit reduces the state's revenue-too speculative to confer taxpayer standing, especially when considering that the credit reduces the state's financial burden for providing public education and is likely the catalyst for new sources of state income? 3. Given that the Arizona Supreme Court has authoritatively determined, under state law, that the money donated to tuition granting organizations under Arizona's tax credit is private, not state, money, can the Respondents establish taxpayer standing to challenge the decisions of private taxpayers as to where they donate their private money? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-15754
In the case of Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Kathleen M. Winn et al., 2010, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of a tax credit program that indirectly provided state aid to religious schools. The plaintiffs argued that this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which prohibits government endorsement or support for religion. However, by a 5-4 majority decision led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, it was held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge this law because they were not directly harmed by it - their taxes did not increase nor were they forced to contribute funds towards any particular religion or school as a result of these credits being available to others who chose them voluntarily.
In the dissenting opinion for Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Kathleen M. Winn et al., Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established precedent regarding taxpayer standing to challenge government expenditures as violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The dissenters believed that taxpayers should have been allowed to challenge Arizona's tax credit program because it effectively resulted in governmental support for religious schools. They contended that this case was similar to Flast v. Cohen (1968), where taxpayers were permitted to contest federal funding of religious schools under a grant program because it constituted an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power which could be challenged on establishment clause grounds.
