In the case of Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall et al., 1980, the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a state court could alter an interstate natural gas rate that had been previously approved by the Federal Power Commission (FPC). The dispute arose when Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company sought to recover from its customers in Arkansas increased costs it incurred due to higher rates charged by its supplier, United Gas Pipe Line Company. These new rates were authorized by FPC but challenged in state courts on grounds of being unjust and unreasonable under state law. The Supreme Court ruled that federal law preempted state regulation in this area, thus affirming the supremacy of federal authority over interstate commerce matters. It held that once FPC approves such rates after finding them just and reasonable as per federal standards, they cannot be contested or modified under any other jurisdiction including states' laws or courts. This decision underscored the principle of preemption where conflicting regulations between different levels of government exist; here it reinforced that only federally-approved bodies have jurisdiction over issues related to interstate commerce like natural gas pricing.

In the dissenting opinion for Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall et al., Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established precedent regarding federal common law in interstate natural gas cases. They contended that this case should have been governed by federal law due to its direct impact on interstate commerce and because it involved an area where uniformity of decision is essential - namely, the regulation of rates charged by companies engaged in transporting natural gas across state lines. The dissenters believed that allowing states to regulate these contracts could lead to inconsistent rulings which would disrupt the national market for natural gas transportation services. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's assertion that Congress had intended for state law to apply in such situations; instead, they maintained there was no clear evidence of Congressional intent either way.