Term: 2010
Docket: 10-98
John D. Ashcroft, Petitioner v. Abdullah Al-kidd
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10-98 ASHCROFT V. AL-KIDD DECISION BELOW: 580 F.3d 949 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. JUSTICE KAGAN TOOK NO PART CERT. GRANTED 10/18/2010 QUESTION PRESENTED: Respondent was arrested on a material witness warrant issued by a federal magistrate judge under 18 U.S.C. 3144 in connection with a pending prosecution. He later filed a Bivens action against petitioner, the former Attorney General of the United States, seeking damages for his arrest. Respondent alleged that his arrest resulted from a policy implemented by the former Attorney General of using the material witness statute as a "pretext" to investigate and preventively detain terrorism suspects. In addition, respondent alleged that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant for his arrest contained false statements. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner absolute immunity from the pretext claim. 2. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner qualified immunity from the pretext claim based on the conclusions that (a) the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from executing a valid material witness warrant with the subjective intent of conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject; and (b) this Fourth Amendment rule was clearly established at the time of respondent's arrest. 3. Whether the former Attorney General may be held liable for the alleged false statements in the affidavit supporting the material witness warrant, even though the complaint does not allege that he either participated in the preparation of the affidavit or implemented any policy encouraging such alleged misconduct. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-36059
In the case of John D. Ashcroft v. Abdullah al-Kidd, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of former Attorney General John Ashcroft, stating that he could not be personally sued over his role in the detention of Abdullah al-Kidd, a U.S. citizen who was held under a federal law intended to compel reluctant witnesses to testify before grand juries and at criminal trials. Al-Kidd argued that his arrest and detention were part of an unconstitutional policy created by Ashcroft after September 11th attacks which used material witness warrants as a pretext for detaining terrorism suspects without probable cause or evidence against them individually. However, the court found no proof that such policy existed or that it violated any clearly established constitutional rights; thus ruling out personal liability for Ashcroft.
In the dissenting opinion for Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, argued that former Attorney General John D. Ashcroft could not be shielded from liability under the federal material witness statute because his use of it was a pretext to detain terrorism suspects without probable cause. The dissenters believed that this misuse violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. They contended that while detaining individuals as witnesses can serve important law enforcement interests, using such detention as a means to investigate those detained is an abuse of power and infringes upon constitutional rights. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority’s view on qualified immunity which protected officials who violate constitutional rights unless those rights were clearly established at the time of violation; instead arguing that any reasonable official would have known this application of law was unconstitutional.
