In the case of Atherton v. Atherton, 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a divorce decree granted in one state should be recognized by another state under Article IV Section I of the Constitution - also known as "Full Faith and Credit Clause". The petitioner, Mr. Atherton had obtained a divorce from his wife in Kentucky on grounds not recognized as valid for divorce in Tennessee where Mrs. Atherton resided. When he later sued her for property rights in Tennessee, she claimed they were still legally married according to their laws despite his Kentucky-granted divorce. The court ruled that while states are generally required to recognize public acts and judicial proceedings of other states under Full Faith and Credit Clause, this does not extend to cases where those rulings violate its own legitimate public policy or statutes; hence it is within each state's right to refuse recognition if it deems necessary due to such reasons. Therefore, since Tennessee did not recognize Mr.Atherton's grounds for obtaining a divorce as valid according its own law at that time (which only allowed divorces on account of adultery), it could choose not acknowledge their marital dissolution decreed by Kentucky.

In the dissenting opinion for Atherton v. Atherton, 1900, Justice Harlan argued that the Court should not have intervened in this case as it was a matter of state law and jurisdiction. He believed that Kentucky's laws regarding divorce were clear and unambiguous, allowing Mrs. Atherton to remarry without any legal impediments following her divorce from Mr. Atherton on grounds of abandonment. The majority’s decision to nullify her second marriage based on an interpretation of Kentucky law contradicted principles of federalism by interfering with states' rights to regulate domestic relations within their borders according to their own policies and traditions. Furthermore, he contended that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require other states or federal courts to question or reinterpret a state court's understanding of its own laws when those interpretations had been clearly established through consistent judicial decisions over time.