In the 1896 case of Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company v. Mingus, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mingus, a landowner who had been sued by the railroad company for trespassing on their property. The dispute arose when Mingus built a fence that crossed over what was claimed to be part of the railroad's right-of-way granted by Congress under an 1866 statute. However, this grant did not include any specific lands but only a general route with its termini designated; it was up to the Secretary of Interior to approve or disapprove locations selected within those limits as per his judgment about public interests. The court held that until such approval is given and maps are filed showing approved sections, no definite location can be made which could exclude prior settlers from occupying these lands under preemption laws (laws allowing first-comers' rights). As there were no records indicating such approvals at times when fences were erected by Mingus or his predecessor in interest, he didn't infringe upon any vested rights of Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Co., hence wasn’t liable for trespassing.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company v. Mingus argued that the majority's decision was incorrect because it failed to properly interpret the language of the legislation at hand, specifically regarding land grants for railroad construction. The dissent contended that Congress intended to grant alternate sections of public lands on each side of railroads as a means to encourage their construction, not just those sections which were vacant at the time when lines were definitely fixed. They believed this interpretation was supported by previous rulings and legislative history surrounding similar cases. Furthermore, they disagreed with how majority interpreted "mineral lands" exception within these land grants, arguing that it should only apply if minerals are found before railway route is definitively established or if mineral existence is known at time of grant issuance. In essence, they felt that majority's ruling unfairly deprived railroad companies from receiving full extent of granted lands due them under law.