In Atlantic Phosphate Company v. Grafflin, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties was valid and enforceable. The contract in question was between the Atlantic Phosphate Company and the defendant, Grafflin. The contract stated that Grafflin would purchase a certain amount of phosphate from the company and pay for it in installments. Grafflin failed to make the payments as agreed and the company sued for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that the contract was valid and enforceable. The Court found that the contract was clear and unambiguous and that the parties had agreed to the terms. The Court also found that the contract was supported by consideration, meaning that each party had given something of value in exchange for the other's promise. The Court held that the contract was binding and that the company was entitled to damages for the breach. The Court's decision in this case established that contracts must be clear and unambiguous and supported by consideration in order to be valid and enforceable. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then and is still used today to determine the validity of contracts.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Atlantic Phosphate Company v. Grafflin, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that under prior decisions of this Court, a patentee who had not used reasonable diligence in perfecting his invention could be denied relief against infringers if he failed to complete it within two years after its issue date. The majority had held otherwise here, finding that because the patentee had made some progress toward completing his invention during those two years, he should be allowed relief even though he did not finish it until later. Justice Field disagreed with this holding and argued instead for strict adherence to existing law on this point: "The rule is well settled," he wrote, "that where there has been no such use or effort as will excuse delay beyond [the two-year period], a court of equity will refuse protection."