Avendano v. Gay was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a foreign judgment could be enforced in the United States. The case involved a dispute between two parties, Avendano and Gay, over a debt that was owed to Avendano. Avendano had obtained a judgment against Gay in a court in Mexico, and he sought to enforce the judgment in the United States. Gay argued that the judgment was not enforceable in the United States because it had been obtained in a foreign court. The Supreme Court held that the judgment was enforceable in the United States. The Court reasoned that the judgment was valid under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, which requires that judgments rendered in one state be given full faith and credit in other states. The Court also noted that the judgment was valid under the laws of the United States, which provide that foreign judgments are enforceable in the United States. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the judgment obtained by Avendano in Mexico was enforceable in the United States. The Court reasoned that the judgment was valid under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States.

In the case of Avendano v. Gay, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority's decision was not supported by precedent or sound legal reasoning. He argued that while it is true that under California law, a husband has an absolute right to his wife's services and labor during marriage, this does not mean he can force her to remain in servitude after their divorce. The court should have recognized Mrs. Avendano’s right to freedom from involuntary servitude as guaranteed by both the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution which states “No person shall be held in slavery or involuntary servitude…” Furthermore, Justice Field argued that since Mrs. Avendano had already been divorced for two years at the time she filed suit against Mr Gay for damages due to her forced service prior to their divorce decree being issued; she should have been allowed compensation for those two years even if they were technically still married when she began serving him involuntarily.