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18-882 BABB V. WILKIE DECISION BELOW: 743 Fed.Appx. 280 GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE FEDERAL- SECTOR PROVISION OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, WHICH PROVIDES THAT PERSONNEL ACTIONS AFFECTING AGENCY EMPLOYEES AGED 40 YEARS OR OLDER SHALL BE MADE FREE FROM ANY “DISCRIMINATION BASED ON AGE,” 29 U.S.C. §633a(a), REQUIRES A PLAINTIFF TO PROVE THAT AGE WAS A BUT-FOR CAUSE OF THE CHALLENGED PERSONNEL ACTION. ORDER OF JANUARY 17, 2020: THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER BRIEFS ADDRESSING THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHAT PROSPECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL RELIEF MAY A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE OBTAIN UNDER LAWS OTHER THAN THE ADEA, INCLUDING UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE LAWS OR THE CONSTITUTION, AGAINST AGE-RELATED POLICIES, PRACTICES, ACTIONS, OR STATEMENTS THAT WERE NOT THE BUT-FOR CAUSE OF AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION AGAINST THE COMPLAINING EMPLOYEE? QUESTION PRESENTED: Federal employees' rights are determined under statutes which require that "all personnel actions effecting employees or applicants for employment ... in executive agencies as defined in Title 5 ... shall be made free from any discrimination ... " See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-16(a) (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (age). This Court, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), interpreted the private-sector statutory language "because" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and ''because of' in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), respectively, as requiring a private-sector plaintiff to prove but-for causation. The question presented is: Whether "shall be made free from any discrimination" permits federal-sector personnel actions that are not made free from any discrimination or retaliation, as long as discrimination or retaliation is not the but-for cause of the personnel action, or rather prohibits personnel actions where discrimination and retaliation is a factor. A subsidiary question is whether Title VII bans retaliation in federal employment. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 16-16492 CERT. GRANTED 6/28/2019
In the case of Babb v. Wilkie, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal employees can sue for age discrimination even if they cannot prove that age was a decisive factor in an employment decision. The plaintiff, Noris Babb, a pharmacist at a Veterans Affairs medical center in Florida alleged she had been passed over for opportunities due to her age and gender. The court's ruling clarified language within the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), stating it is enough to demonstrate that an employment decision was tainted by such considerations even if other factors contributed to the outcome as well. This interpretation broadens protections against workplace discrimination for federal workers beyond what private-sector employees are entitled to under separate provisions of ADEA.
In the dissenting opinion for Babb v. Wilkie, Justice Alito argued that the majority misinterpreted federal law by ruling that age must be a factor in an employment decision to establish liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). He contended that this interpretation is inconsistent with common legal usage and could lead to absurd results. For instance, he pointed out scenarios where trivial considerations related to age could result in ADEA violations even if they did not affect employment outcomes. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view on remedies available under ADEA, arguing it contradicted Congress' intent when drafting these laws. Instead of allowing any form of relief as long as age was a consideration in an employment decision, Justice Alito believed plaintiffs should only receive relief if they can prove their age was determinative or decisive factor behind adverse actions taken against them.