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18-6943 BANISTER V. DAVIS DECISION BELOW: 5/8/2018 CTA 5 ORDER GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES A TIMELY RULE 59 (e) MOTION SHOULD BE RECHARACTERIZED AS A SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE HABEAS PETITION UNDER GONZALEZ v. CROSBY, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). CERT. GRANTED 6/24/2019 QUESTION PRESENTED: Question One: In Gonzalez V. Crosby this Court held that a Rule 60(b) motion that either adds new habeas claim or attacks the court's previous resolution of the habeas claims, should be treated as a successive habeas petition under AEDPA's §2244. Does Gonzalez extend to post-judgment motions filed under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? a. If so, should a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion toll the the time to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)? Question Two: Whether a pro se petitioner must be warned and given an opportunity to withdraw a post-judgment motion which has been recharacterized as a successive habeas petition if that recharacterization will effect his ability to file a timely notice of appeal? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 17-10826
In the case of Banister v. Davis, Gregory Dean Banister appealed his state conviction and sentence in federal court through a habeas corpus petition but was denied. He then filed what he called a "Rule 59(e)" motion to alter or amend the judge's decision, which was also rejected on grounds that it was actually an unauthorized second or successive habeas application under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Supreme Court held that a Rule 59(e) motion should not be recharacterized as an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition. This ruling allows prisoners like Banister to use such motions for reconsideration without needing prior authorization from appellate courts. The majority opinion emphasized that this interpretation aligns with traditional rules of procedure and respects prisoner rights while still maintaining AEDPA’s goal of preventing abusive litigation.
In the dissenting opinion for Banister v. Davis, Justice Alito argued that the majority's decision would have significant implications on habeas corpus proceedings and could potentially lead to an increase in frivolous litigation. He contended that a Rule 59(e) motion should be treated as a second or successive habeas petition if it raises new claims or presents old claims in a new light, which is consistent with previous rulings of the Court. The justice also expressed concerns about potential abuse of this rule by prisoners who might use it to delay their sentences indefinitely. Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on historical practices rather than statutory interpretation to reach its conclusion.