In the case of Barbara Franklin, Secretary of Commerce, et al. v. Massachusetts et al., 1991, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Secretary of Commerce's decision to statistically adjust census data for purposes other than apportionment violated federal law or was arbitrary and capricious under Administrative Procedure Act standards. The state of Massachusetts had sued after losing a congressional seat due to population shifts recorded in the 1990 Census; it argued that an adjustment for an estimated undercount would have preserved its representation. However, the court ruled in favor of Franklin and held that neither federal law nor constitutional provisions required statistical adjustments for purposes beyond apportionment among states (which is explicitly prohibited). Furthermore, they found no evidence suggesting that her decision not to adjust was arbitrary or capricious.

In the dissenting opinion for Barbara Franklin, Secretary of Commerce, et al. v. Massachusetts et al., Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision to uphold the use of statistical adjustment in apportionment was flawed because it failed to consider whether such a method is consistent with constitutional and statutory requirements. He contended that while there may be practical reasons for using statistical adjustments, these do not override legal mandates which require an "actual enumeration" or physical headcount as stipulated by Article I Section 2 of the Constitution and Title 13 U.S.C §195 respectively. Furthermore, he criticized how this ruling could potentially open doors for manipulation in future censuses since any changes made post-enumeration would be difficult to challenge legally due to time constraints imposed by statute on reapportionment process.