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In the 1915 case of Barlow v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railway company. The plaintiff, Barlow, had sued for damages after a fire allegedly started by sparks from one of the defendant's locomotives destroyed his property. However, he was unable to provide direct evidence that linked the fire to a specific train or engine owned by Northern Pacific Railway Company. Instead, he relied on circumstantial evidence and local laws which held railroads liable for fires caused by their engines unless they could prove otherwise. The court found this approach problematic as it shifted burden of proof onto defendants contrary to common law principles where plaintiffs are required to establish negligence on part of defendants beyond reasonable doubt before any liability can be imposed upon them. Therefore, despite acknowledging potential difficulties faced by plaintiffs in such cases due its nature (i.e., proving exact cause), it upheld dismissal at lower courts stating that mere possibility or probability is not enough; there must be certainty or at least strong likelihood linking defendant’s actions with alleged damage.
In the dissenting opinion for Barlow v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a state law requiring railroads to provide separate accommodations for black and white passengers violated both the Fourteenth Amendment and Interstate Commerce Act. The dissenting justices believed that such laws were inherently discriminatory and served no legitimate purpose other than to perpetuate racial segregation. They also contended that by upholding this law, the Court was effectively endorsing a system of racial discrimination in public transportation which could have far-reaching implications beyond just railway travel. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's assertion that providing separate but equal facilities did not constitute unlawful discrimination under federal law or violate constitutional rights.