In the case of Frederick J. and Samuel W. Barnard and Heney Q. Hawley v John Gibson, the appellants argued that a certain deed was invalid because it had not been properly acknowledged before a justice of the peace as required by law at the time. The Supreme Court held that although there were technical errors in how it was executed, they did not affect its validity since all parties involved had agreed to its terms and acted upon them accordingly for many years prior to this dispute arising between them. Furthermore, any defects in execution could be remedied through an amendment or supplemental deed if necessary without affecting either party's rights under the original agreement.

In the case of Frederick J. and Samuel W. Barnard and Henery Q. Hawley v John Gibson, the dissenting opinion argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced even if it is not in writing or signed by both parties as long as there was an agreement to enter into such a contract. The dissent argued that verbal contracts are just as binding under law as written ones, so long as they meet certain criteria such as being made with mutual consent from both sides and having some form of consideration exchanged for goods or services rendered. Furthermore, the dissent noted that oral agreements can often provide more flexibility than written contracts since they do not require signatures or other formalities to be legally enforceable; thus, any attempt to invalidate them on those grounds would be unjustified according to established legal precedent. Ultimately, this dissenting opinion sought to uphold the sanctity of verbal contracts despite their lack of physical evidence in order to ensure fairness for all involved parties when disputes arise over contractual obligations