The U.S. Supreme Court case Michael Barnes, Prosecuting Attorney of St. Joseph County, Indiana v. Glen Theatre Inc., 1990 revolved around a First Amendment challenge to an Indiana public indecency law that prohibited complete nudity in public places including adult entertainment establishments. The respondents, two adult entertainment establishments and an erotic dancer who performed at these venues argued that the statute violated their right to freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment. However, the court ruled in favor of Barnes (the petitioner), upholding the constitutionality of the law with a 5-4 decision on June 21st, 1990. The majority opinion held that while nude dancing was indeed expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of First Amendment protection; such protection was not absolute and could be regulated if it served substantial governmental interests - here being societal order and morality which were unrelated to suppressing free speech or expression. In this context, requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings did not deprive dance performances from expressing erotic message nor significantly impact any potential audience's ability to receive said message thus making it constitutional under United States' laws.

In the dissenting opinion for Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Justice White argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings on First Amendment rights and freedom of expression. He contended that nude dancing is a form of expressive conduct protected by the Constitution, even if it may be considered offensive or immoral by some people. Furthermore, he believed that Indiana's public indecency law was overly broad and could potentially infringe upon other forms of constitutionally-protected speech beyond just nudity in adult entertainment establishments. Justice White also disagreed with the majority's assertion that banning nude dancing serves a substantial government interest in preserving societal order and morality; instead, he suggested this rationale could lead to censorship based on moral judgments rather than legitimate state interests.