In the case of Kay Barnes, etc., et al. v. Jeffrey Gorman in 2001, the United States Supreme Court addressed issues related to damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff, Jeffrey Gorman who uses a wheelchair due to paralysis, claimed that his rights were violated when he was transported by police officers in a non-wheelchair accessible van which resulted in physical injury and humiliation. He sued Kansas City and its officials for compensatory damages under ADA's Title II. The court ruled that punitive damages are not available under Title II of ADA but affirmed that compensatory damages could be awarded if intentional discrimination is proven on part of public entities or their representatives.

In the dissenting opinion for Kay Barnes, Etc., et al. v. Jeffrey Gorman, the justice argued that the majority's decision to limit damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was not in line with Congress' intent when it enacted this law. The justice believed that by limiting compensatory damages only to cases involving intentional discrimination and excluding those involving failure to accommodate, as in Gorman’s case who is a paraplegic man denied accessible transportation by city officials, undermines ADA's purpose which is to provide clear and comprehensive national mandate for eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The dissent also pointed out that there are no explicit limitations on remedies within Title II itself; hence courts should not impose their own restrictions without clear legislative guidance.