Bean v. Beckwith et al. was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The case arose when a prisoner, William Bean, was held in federal custody in the state of Mississippi. Bean sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, which was denied. Bean then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Bean v. Beckwith et al., arguing that the majority's decision was wrongfully based on a misreading of the relevant statute. He argued that, under its plain language, it did not apply to this case and thus should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, he noted that even if it were applicable, there was no evidence presented to show any fraud or misrepresentation by either party which would have been necessary for a successful suit against them. Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating that while he believed the plaintiff had suffered an injustice due to their failure to receive payment from defendants as promised in their contract, they could not seek relief through this particular court because it lacked jurisdiction over such matters.