In the case of Beard v. Stahr, Secretary of the Army et al., 1961, plaintiff William E. Beard sued for reinstatement to his former position as a civilian employee with the Department of Defense after being discharged due to alleged disloyalty. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Beard on procedural grounds rather than addressing the merits or substance of his loyalty allegations directly. Beard had been dismissed from his job based on anonymous tips that he was involved in subversive activities and associations which were deemed potentially harmful to national security by an army loyalty board. However, he was not provided with any specifics about these accusations nor given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him during proceedings before this board. The Supreme Court held that such procedures violated principles fundamental to American jurisprudence and constitutional law - specifically those related to fair hearing requirements under Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause - thereby rendering them invalid and unconstitutional. As a result, it ordered Mr. Beard’s reinstatement into service pending further investigation conducted according proper legal standards ensuring fairness and justice.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Beard v. Stahr, Secretary of the Army, et al., argued that the majority's decision to uphold a military regulation banning beards was an overreach and unnecessary intrusion into personal liberties. The dissenters believed that there was no compelling evidence presented by the government to justify this infringement on individual rights. They contended that such regulations should only be upheld when they are necessary for maintaining discipline or ensuring safety within military ranks - neither of which were convincingly demonstrated in this case. Furthermore, they pointed out inconsistencies with other branches of service allowing neatly trimmed facial hair without any apparent negative consequences on order or morale. Thus, they concluded that it is not within their purview as justices to decide what constitutes proper grooming standards for servicemen; rather it should be left up to each branch’s discretion unless clear harm can be proven.