In Nathaniel S. Benton, District Attorney of the United States for the Northern District of New York v. Melancthon T. Woolsey, The Bank of Utica et al., a dispute arose between two parties over an alleged breach in contract and fraud concerning a loan agreement made by The Bank of Utica to Woolsey. In this case, it was determined that although there were some discrepancies in the terms and conditions agreed upon by both parties at the time when they entered into their contract, these discrepancies did not constitute as fraud or any other form of misrepresentation on behalf of either party involved in this case; rather they were simply minor errors which could be easily rectified without causing any harm to either party's interests or rights under law. Furthermore, it was also ruled that since no actual damages had been caused due to these discrepancies then neither party would be held liable for them and thus no further action needed to be taken against either side regarding this matter.

In the dissenting opinion of Nathaniel S. Benton v. Melancthon T. Woolsey, The Bank of Utica et al., Justice McLean argued that the court should not have granted a writ of mandamus to compel the district attorney to prosecute an indictment against Woolsey and his associates for issuing notes in violation of state law. He believed that it was inappropriate for a federal court to interfere with matters which were within the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts, as this case clearly was since it involved violations only under New York State laws regarding banking regulations and currency issuance. Furthermore, he argued that even if there had been some sort of federal interest at stake in this case, Congress had never given any authority or power over such matters to either circuit or district courts; thus they lacked jurisdiction on these grounds as well. In conclusion, Justice McLean concluded that granting a writ would be an unwarranted interference by one branch into another's domain and could set dangerous precedents going forward if allowed here today without clear congressional authorization first being established beforehand for such actions by lower courts like those present here today in this particular instance between Mr Benton and Mr Woolsey et al..