Bigelow v. Armes was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of error to a federal court. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a steamboat. The defendant, Armes, had sued the plaintiff, Bigelow, in a state court for breach of contract. The state court found in favor of Armes and issued a writ of error to the federal court. Bigelow argued that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of error to the federal court. The Supreme Court agreed with Bigelow, ruling that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of error to the federal court. The Court reasoned that the state court was not a court of the United States and therefore did not have the power to issue a writ of error to the federal court. The Court also noted that the state court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, which was a contract between two parties. The Court's ruling in Bigelow v. Armes established that state courts do not have the authority to issue a writ of error to a federal court. This ruling has been cited in numerous subsequent cases and is still good law today.

In Bigelow v. Armes, the United States Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a state court could issue an injunction to prevent publication of a libelous article in another state. The majority opinion held that it could not, as such action would be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that states should have authority over matters within their own borders and that allowing them to enjoin publications outside their jurisdiction would not interfere with interstate commerce or violate any constitutional rights. He further argued that if Congress had intended for states to lack such power they would have explicitly stated so in legislation rather than leaving it up to judicial interpretation. Ultimately, he concluded by asserting his belief that courts should err on the side of caution when interpreting laws related to federalism issues and allow states more leeway in exercising control over matters within their jurisdictions unless there is clear evidence otherwise provided by Congress or other governing bodies.