Blanche v. Lau

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 9 Jan 2026

Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), various categories of aliens, including those who have committed or been convicted of certain crimes, are "ineligible to be admitted to the United States" and subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2); see 8 U.S.C. 1229a. Under 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(13)(C), a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who is returning to the United States after a trip abroad is generally not "regarded as seeking an admission into the United States" and is therefore not typically subject to the inadmissibility grounds in Section 1182(a). But that general rule does not apply to an LPR who "has committed an offense identified in section 1182 (a)(2)"­ i.e., an offense that would render him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). The question presented is: Whether, to remove an LPR who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the LPR's last reentry into the United States.

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

The case concerned whether a lawful permanent resident returning from abroad could be treated at the border as an applicant for admission because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude, even though the border officer did not have clear and convincing evidence of that before parole. Justice Thomas wrote that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not impose that border-stage clear and convincing evidence requirement. The Court explained that the statute allows the Government to regard a lawful permanent resident as seeking admission once he has committed a listed offense, while conviction is needed later to prove inadmissibility. The Court said Lau’s guilty plea satisfied the Government’s burden at the removal hearing, and it rejected the argument that conviction was required before the border determination. It vacated the Second Circuit and remanded because the court had not decided whether Lau’s offense was a crime involving moral turpitude.

Dissent summary

Etalia.ai summary of the dissenting opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, argued that the statute requires the Government to decide at the border whether one of the listed exceptions applies before stripping a returning lawful permanent resident of his already-admitted status. The dissent said the majority wrongly allowed the Government to treat the resident as seeking admission first and justify that decision later at a removal hearing. In Jackson’s view, the statute’s text uses a mandatory default rule that lawful permanent residents shall not be regarded as seeking admission unless an exception applies, so the Government must have the requisite certainty at the border. The dissent also argued that the majority’s reading undermines the special status and protections Congress gave lawful permanent residents.