Boffinger v. Tuyes was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Boffinger, was held in a federal prison in New York and sought a writ of habeas corpus from a state court. The state court issued the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right. The Court's decision in Boffinger v. Tuyes established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the idea that the federal government has the power to protect the fundamental right of habeas corpus.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Boffinger v. Tuyes, arguing that the majority’s decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to a “confusion of rights” between mortgagors and mortgagees. He argued that when a mortgagor conveys property subject to an existing mortgage, they are not liable for any debt or obligation beyond what is specified in the original mortgage agreement. In this case, he argued that there was no evidence of any additional obligations imposed on the defendant by either party prior to conveyance; therefore, it should be assumed that all obligations were extinguished upon transfer of title from one party to another. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that if such debts could be enforced against subsequent purchasers without their knowledge or consent then it would create an undue burden on them as well as confusion over who holds legal title and responsibility for payment of mortgages. Ultimately, he concluded by stating his belief that enforcing such debts against innocent parties without their knowledge or consent violated basic principles of justice and equity which should govern all transactions involving real estate titles.