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04-1360 HUDSON V. MICHIGAN DECISION BELOW: unpublished (2004 WL 1366947) ORIGINAL ARGUMENT 01/09/2006 http://www.court.gov/arguments/term2005/04- 1360.pdf ORDER OF 04/19/2006: THIS CASE IS RESTORED TO THE CALENDAR FOR REARGUMENT. CERT. GRANTED 6/27/2005 QUESTION PRESENTED: Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment "knock and announce" violation, as the Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court have held, or is evidence subject to suppression after such violations, as the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the Arkansas Supreme Court, and the Maryland Court of Appeals have held? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 246403
In the 2005 case of Booker T. Hudson, Jr. v. Michigan, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that evidence seized in violation of the "knock and announce" rule could be used in court under certain circumstances. The "knock and announce" rule requires police to knock on a door and announce their presence before entering a home with a search warrant unless they have reasonable suspicion that doing so would be dangerous or futile or inhibit an investigation by allowing destruction of evidence. Hudson was convicted based on drugs found during such a search where officers had announced themselves but waited only three to five seconds before entering his home after receiving no response. The Supreme Court held (in a 5-4 decision) that while this violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches, it did not require suppression of evidence as remedy because police had acted in good faith believing they were following legal procedures.
In the case of Booker T. Hudson, Jr. v Michigan, 2005, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argued that the majority's decision to uphold evidence obtained in violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule undermined Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. He contended that this ruling would encourage police misconduct by removing a key deterrent - exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from trial proceedings. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s view that civil lawsuits could effectively deter violations as there was little empirical support for this claim and it did not take into account situations where rights were violated but no tangible harm resulted to sue for damages. Thus, he believed excluding such evidence at trial remained an essential tool in enforcing constitutional rights.