In the case of Boston Sand and Gravel Company v. United States, 1928, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the U.S. government regarding a dispute over land ownership rights along a riverbed. The Boston Sand and Gravel Company claimed that they owned part of the Mystic River's bed due to their purchase from previous owners who had held title since colonial times. However, according to federal law at that time, when Massachusetts became a state in 1789, it gained ownership of all navigable waterways within its borders including riverbeds unless explicitly granted otherwise by Congress - which was not done for this particular stretch of riverbed property under contention. The court upheld this principle known as "equal footing doctrine," stating that new states automatically gain sovereignty over these lands upon entering Union regardless if private parties claim prior ownership based on colonial-era grants or purchases. Therefore, any subsequent transfer by Massachusetts (or other states) without explicit congressional approval would be invalid against federal claims. This ruling reinforced federal authority over navigable waters and related properties while also clarifying legal ambiguities around historical land transfers dating back to America’s early history.

In the dissenting opinion for Boston Sand and Gravel Company v. United States, it was argued that the government's use of a private company's land to deposit dredged material constituted an act of trespass rather than eminent domain. The dissenting justices contended that this action did not align with constitutional provisions regarding property rights and compensation for public use. They maintained that if such actions were allowed without proper compensation, it would set a dangerous precedent where the government could infringe upon private property rights under the guise of public benefit or necessity without providing just compensation as required by law. Furthermore, they disagreed with majority’s interpretation about what constitutes 'public use,' arguing instead that any intrusion on privately owned lands should be considered within this definition regardless of whether permanent structures are erected or not.