Bourne v. Goodyear was a United States Supreme Court case that was decided in 1869. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a steamboat. The plaintiff, Bourne, had contracted with the defendant, Goodyear, to purchase a steamboat for $2,000. Goodyear had agreed to deliver the boat to Bourne, but failed to do so. Bourne then sued Goodyear for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that Goodyear was liable for breach of contract. The Court found that Goodyear had failed to fulfill its contractual obligations and that Bourne was entitled to damages. The Court also held that the contract was valid and enforceable, and that Bourne was entitled to recover the full amount of the purchase price. The Court's decision in Bourne v. Goodyear established the principle that a party who fails to fulfill its contractual obligations is liable for breach of contract. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases and is still used today to determine the rights and obligations of parties in contract disputes.

In the case of Bourne v. Goodyear, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a patentee could recover damages for an infringement that occurred before their patent was issued. The majority opinion held that such recovery would be allowed, but Justice Field dissented from this decision and argued that allowing such recovery would create a monopoly on ideas which had been in use prior to the issuance of the patent. He reasoned that it would also lead to uncertainty as inventors may not know if they are infringing upon someone else's rights or not until after they have already invested time and money into developing their invention. Furthermore, he argued that Congress did not intend for patents to provide protection against pre-existing uses when it passed legislation granting them exclusive rights over new inventions and discoveries. As such, Justice Field concluded by stating his belief that allowing post-issuance damages for pre-existing infringements should be left up to Congress rather than decided by judicial interpretation of existing laws.