Bowden v. Johnson was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Bowden, was held in a federal prison in Georgia. Bowden sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a prisoner's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the prisoner's confinement. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Bowden v. Johnson, arguing that the majority's decision was too broad and could lead to an unjust result. He argued that a state court should be able to decide whether or not a contract is valid under its own laws, even if it conflicts with federal law. In this case, he believed that Georgia had the right to determine whether or not Bowden's contract was valid under their own laws since it did not conflict with any federal statutes. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that Congress had no authority over contracts made between citizens of different states unless they were related to interstate commerce which this one clearly wasn't. Therefore, he concluded by stating his belief that the Supreme Court should have allowed Georgia courts to make their own determination on validity of contracts without interference from Congress or other states' courts as long as they did not violate any federal statutes