In Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a railroad company was liable for damages caused by a train accident. The plaintiff, Bowman, was a passenger on the train when it collided with another train. He was injured in the accident and sued the railroad company for damages. The Supreme Court held that the railroad company was liable for the damages caused by the accident. The Court reasoned that the railroad company had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of its trains and that it had breached this duty by failing to take proper precautions to prevent the accident. The Court also held that the railroad company was liable for the damages caused by the accident, even though the accident was caused by the negligence of another train's engineer. The Court's decision established that railroad companies have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of their trains and that they are liable for damages caused by their negligence. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then and has become an important precedent in the area of railroad liability.

Justice Harlan delivered the dissenting opinion in Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, arguing that the majority's decision was wrongfully decided. He argued that a state law could not be used to take away rights granted by Congress under federal statutes, as this would violate the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The Court had previously held that when a railroad company accepted land grants from Congress it became subject to certain conditions imposed by those grants; one such condition being an obligation on behalf of railroads to pay damages for injuries caused by their negligence or wrongful acts. Justice Harlan believed these obligations should remain intact despite any conflicting state laws which may have been passed after acceptance of said grant lands. He further argued that if states were allowed to pass laws which superseded federally-imposed obligations then they would effectively nullify Congressional authority over interstate commerce - something he felt was unconstitutional and beyond their power as individual states.