Brazee v. Schofield was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Brazee, was held in a federal prison in Ohio and sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Brazee v. Schofield, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that under prior decisions of the Supreme Court, a judgment creditor could not be deprived of his right to levy on property which had been attached by him before it became subject to another lien or mortgage. The fact that a subsequent purchaser had paid value for such property did not give him any greater rights than those held by the original mortgagor or grantee; rather, he took with notice of all existing liens and encumbrances upon it. Justice Field concluded that since Schofield had no knowledge at the time he purchased his interest in this land from Brazee about any attachment made against her title thereto, he should not be allowed to take advantage of such attachment now as against Brazee’s creditors who were entitled thereto when they levied their attachments thereon.