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02-337 BREUER v. JIM'S CONCRETE OF BREVARD Ruling below: CA 11, 292 F.3d 1308. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: Whether an action commenced in state court under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (the "FLSA"), can be removed by the defendant to a federal district court, even though the FLSA expressly provides that the case can be "maintained" in state court? Whether the Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation of the word "maintained" as used in the jurisdictional provisions of the FLSA conflicts with this Court's pronounced definition of the word "maintain" to be used when construing federal statutes? Whether the conflict, disparity and deadlock of opinion between the Eleventh and First Circuits and the Eighth Circuit, and between dozens of district courts around the country, regarding whether FLSA actions commenced in state court are removable to federal court, warrants that this Court, as suggested by the Eleventh Circuit in its opinion below, grant this petition to resolve the question once and for all in order to bring uniformity to the federal courts, and eliminate widespread disparity between litigants in our federal system. CERT. GRANTED: 1/10/03 Expedited briefing schedule.
In the case of Phillip T. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim under both federal and state law in state court if their federal claim is subject to compulsory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The dispute arose when Breuer filed suit against his former employer, Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, alleging violations of both Florida labor laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). However, an employment agreement between them mandated that all disputes be resolved through arbitration. The company moved for dismissal or stay pending arbitration as per FAA guidelines which was denied by lower courts on grounds that FLSA claims were not arbitrable unless expressly agreed upon after dispute arises. On appeal to Supreme Court though it held that even if FLSA claims are non-arbitrable without express consent post-dispute arising; once they become part of an action containing other arbitrable claims like those based on state law here – then entire action must be stayed until completion of arbitration proceedings.
In the dissenting opinion for Phillip T. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of Section 1367(a) and its application to this case. She argued that Congress intended for supplemental jurisdiction to be broadly interpreted in order to promote judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. The majority’s decision not only contradicted these goals but also ignored precedent set by previous cases which allowed claims under state law when they were part of the same case or controversy as a federal claim. Furthermore, she contended that there was no evidence suggesting Congress meant for §1367(a)’s grant of jurisdiction over “other claims” to exclude those made by third-party defendants against original plaintiffs; rather it should include all claims arising from a common nucleus of operative fact regardless who asserts them.