Term: 2006
Docket: 05-11287
Brent Ray Brewer v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department Of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
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05-11287 BREWER V. QUARTERMAN DECISION BELOW:442 F3d 273 CONSOLIDATED WITH 05-11284 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT CERT. GRANTED 10/13/2006 QUESTIONS PRESENTED: 1. Do the former Texas “special issue” capital sentencing jury instructions — which permit jurors to register only a “yes” or “no” answer to two questions, inquiring whether the defendant killed “deliberately” and probably would constitute a “continuing threat to society” — permit constitutionally adequate consideration of mitigating evidence about a defendant’s mental impairment and childhood mistreatment and deprivation, in light of this Court’s emphatic statement in Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004), that those same two questions “had little, if anything, to do with” Smith’s evidence of mental impairment and childhood mistreatment)? 2. Do this Court’s recent opinions in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (“Penry II”) and Smith, both of which require instructions that permit jurors to give “full consideration and full effect” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence in choosing the appropriate sentence, preclude the Fifth Circuit from adhering to its prior decisions — antedating Penry II and Smith — that reject Penry error whenever the former special issues might have afforded some indirect consideration of the defendant’s mitigating evidence? 3. Has the Fifth Circuit, in insisting that a defendant show as a predicate to relief under Penry that he suffers from a mental disorder that is severe, permanent or untreatable, simply resurrected the threshold test for “constitutional relevance” that this Court emphatically rejected in Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)? 4. Where the prosecution, as it did here, repeatedly implores jurors to “follow the law” and “do their duty” by answering the former Texas special issues on their own terms and abjuring any attempt to use their answers to effect an appropriate sentence, is it reasonably likely that jurors applied their instructions in a way that prevented them from fully considering and giving effect to the defendant’s mitigating evidence? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-70034
The U.S. Supreme Court case Brent Ray Brewer v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (2006) revolved around the issue of whether a death row inmate was entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on his claim that he is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia (2002). The Fifth Circuit had denied relief because it found that the state court's rejection of this claim was not unreasonable given the evidence presented at a state post-conviction hearing in 1991 - before Atkins decision which made executing intellectually disabled individuals unconstitutional. However, Brewer argued that new psychological evaluations conducted after Atkins demonstrated his mental retardation more clearly than earlier tests did and should be considered by courts reviewing his claims under AEDPA standards. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded back to lower courts for further consideration in light of its recent ruling in Tennard v Dretke (2004), where it held that any aspect of defendant’s character or record could serve as mitigating circumstance reducing culpability.
In the dissenting opinion for Brent Ray Brewer v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Justice Alito disagreed with the majority's decision to grant habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing. He argued that while there were deficiencies in Brewer's defense counsel’s performance, they did not prejudice his case enough to warrant a new trial. The evidence against Brewer was overwhelming and included eyewitness testimony identifying him as one of two men who committed murder during a robbery. Moreover, he contended that even if all mitigating evidence had been presented at sentencing, it would not have changed the outcome given the severity of his crime and prior criminal record. Therefore, according to Justice Alito's view, granting habeas relief under these circumstances set an unreasonable standard for evaluating attorney performance and could potentially undermine public confidence in judicial proceedings.
