In the 1982 case Briscoe et al. v. Lahue et al., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that witnesses, including police officers, are immune from being sued for damages by a defendant who claims to have been wrongfully convicted due to perjured testimony provided by those witnesses during trial proceedings. The court held that this immunity extends even when it is alleged that the witness knowingly gave false testimony or acted maliciously with intent to cause an unjust conviction. This decision was based on common law principles and Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code which allows individuals to sue state officials for civil rights violations but does not explicitly allow suits against private parties acting as witnesses in judicial proceedings.

In the dissenting opinion for Briscoe et al. v. Lahue et al., Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that the majority's decision to grant absolute immunity to police officers who commit perjury in court proceedings undermines the integrity of the judicial process and contradicts Congress' intent when it enacted Section 1983. The dissenters contended that such a broad interpretation of witness immunity is not supported by common law history or public policy considerations. They pointed out that this ruling could potentially encourage dishonesty among law enforcement officials and erode public trust in legal institutions as there would be no civil recourse against officers who deliberately lie under oath. Furthermore, they asserted that this decision effectively leaves victims of police perjury without any remedy for their constitutional injuries, which goes against one of the main purposes of Section 1983 - to provide individuals with protection from abuses of power by state actors.