Isaac Brown, the appellant in this case, was a slave who had been purchased by Joseph P. Shannon and brought to Washington D.C., which at that time prohibited slavery within its borders. After being held as a slave for some time, Brown filed suit against Shannon seeking his freedom on the grounds of having been illegally brought into the city limits in violation of local law. The lower court ruled against him and he appealed to the Supreme Court where Chief Justice Taney delivered an opinion affirming that decision but also setting forth certain principles regarding slavery that would become important precedents for future cases concerning slaves' rights under federal law. In particular, Taney argued that since Congress had not passed any laws regulating slavery or providing protection to slaves from their owners' actions then it must be assumed they were subject only to state laws governing such matters; thus if a state allowed slavery then it could not be challenged on constitutional grounds even when taken across state lines into another jurisdiction where it was illegal.

In the dissenting opinion of Isaac Brown v. Joseph P. Shannon et al., Justice Wayne argued that the plaintiff had not been deprived of his constitutional rights as a slave owner, and thus should not be entitled to compensation for damages caused by the defendants’ actions. He reasoned that since slavery was legal in Georgia at the time, it could not be considered unconstitutional or unlawful for someone to interfere with another person's right to own slaves; therefore, any interference would have no effect on their property rights and they would have no claim against those who interfered with them. Furthermore, he argued that even if there had been an infringement upon Brown’s property rights due to slavery being illegal under federal law, this did not entitle him to compensation from individuals acting within state laws which allowed such ownership. In conclusion, Justice Wayne concluded that although he sympathized with Brown's situation as a slave owner whose property was taken away without just cause or remuneration, he believed it was beyond the scope of judicial power for courts to award damages in such cases where there has been no violation of constitutional protections afforded by either state or federal law.