In the 1997 case of Sillasse Bryan v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant could be convicted for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence if he did not personally use or carry the weapon but was held accountable under principles of co-conspirator liability. The court ruled that aiding and abetting liability applies to all offenses committed by a principal, including secondary offenses committed in furtherance of other crimes. Therefore, even though Bryan himself did not physically carry or use the firearm during his commission of drug trafficking crimes, as long as one participant knowingly uses or carries a gun while committing these crimes within their joint criminal venture, all participants can be held liable for this offense.

In the dissenting opinion for Sillasse Bryan v. United States, Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's decision to uphold Bryan's conviction under 18 U.S.C §924(a)(1)(D) was incorrect because it failed to consider whether Bryan had knowledge of his legal obligation not to engage in firearms dealing without a license. She contended that the statute required proof of willfulness, which she interpreted as requiring evidence that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful. In her view, this interpretation aligned with traditional understandings of willfulness and protected individuals from being punished for unknowingly violating obscure or complex regulations. Furthermore, she pointed out inconsistencies in how courts have applied standards of willfulness across different statutes and called for greater clarity on this issue.