In the 1990 case of William J. Burns v. United States, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court could consider conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted when determining an appropriate sentence for a conviction. The decision was based on the principle that sentencing courts have traditionally considered information about the defendant's background, character and conduct in deciding upon an appropriate punishment within statutory limits. William J. Burns had been convicted of mail fraud but acquitted on racketeering charges related to his role in defrauding insurance companies out of millions of dollars through arson-for-profit schemes. However, during sentencing for his mail fraud conviction, evidence from his acquittal was used against him resulting in a harsher sentence than he would have otherwise received under federal guidelines. Burns appealed this decision arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as well as contradicting principles established by previous cases such as United States v Halper (1989). Despite these arguments, the Supreme Court upheld its original ruling stating that considering all relevant conduct regardless of whether it resulted in conviction is consistent with longstanding practice and does not violate any constitutional rights.

In the dissenting opinion for William J. Burns v. United States, Justice Marshall argued that the majority's decision to uphold a sentence enhancement based on conduct not charged in an indictment violated the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. He contended that it was unconstitutional to increase a defendant’s punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone, without any additional findings of fact made by a judge or admitted by the defendant himself. He also expressed concern about potential abuses of power if judges were allowed to impose harsher sentences based on their own determination of facts not presented at trial or found by a jury beyond reasonable doubt.