In the case of Horace Butler v. Kenneth D. McKellar, Warden et al., 1989, the U.S Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a Tennessee state prisoner could use federal habeas corpus proceedings to challenge his death sentence on grounds that were not raised in his initial appeal or post-conviction relief proceedings at the state level. The court ruled against Butler and held that he had procedurally defaulted on these claims by failing to raise them in accordance with Tennessee's procedural rules during his direct appeal or first post-conviction proceeding. Therefore, unless he could show cause for this default and actual prejudice resulting from it, he would be barred from raising these issues in federal habeas corpus proceedings under existing precedent.

In the dissenting opinion for Horace Butler v. Kenneth D. McKellar, Warden, et al., Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's decision to deny habeas corpus relief to a prisoner who claimed his Sixth Amendment right was violated due to ineffective counsel during sentencing. He argued that there should be no distinction between guilt and penalty phases of trial when considering whether an attorney’s performance is constitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington standard (1984). Brennan believed that if a lawyer fails in their duty at any stage of proceedings it can result in serious injustice for defendants like Butler who received death sentence partly because his lawyer did not present mitigating evidence about his background and character during sentencing phase which could have potentially spared him from capital punishment.