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In the case of Cain et al. v. Kentucky, 1969, the U.S Supreme Court dealt with issues related to racial discrimination in jury selection processes. The appellants were African American defendants convicted by an all-white jury in a state court in Kentucky. They argued that their Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated due to systematic exclusion of black people from both grand and petit juries over many years, which was supported by statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of African Americans on these juries compared to their proportion in the population. The Supreme Court held that if a racial group is substantially underrepresented for a significant period of time, this can be seen as prima facie proof (evidence sufficient unless rebutted) of discriminatory purpose and violation of equal protection clause under Fourteenth Amendment even without any direct evidence proving such intent or practice. However, it also ruled that since there was no clear record indicating whether or not there had been consistent substantial underrepresentation over time nor enough data about race distribution among those eligible for jury service at relevant times; therefore they could not conclude beyond reasonable doubt that discrimination occurred here specifically.
The dissenting opinion in the case of Cain et al. v. Kentucky argued that the majority's decision to uphold a state law prohibiting picketing near courthouses was an infringement on First Amendment rights, specifically freedom of speech and assembly. The dissenters believed that peaceful picketing is a form of expression protected by the Constitution, regardless of its location. They also pointed out inconsistencies in how this law was applied, noting it seemed to be enforced selectively based on content or viewpoint rather than uniformly for all forms of protest near courthouses. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's assertion that such protests could potentially influence court proceedings or jurors; instead arguing there were already laws in place to prevent such interference without infringing upon free speech rights.