Edmund B. Caldwell, the surviving partner of James Lynd Jr. and Company, brought a case to the Supreme Court against the United States in 1850. The dispute arose from an 1845 contract between Caldwell's company and the government for supplying timber for use in constructing fortifications at various military posts along Lake Michigan. After completing their work under this contract, Caldwell sought payment from Congress but was denied due to a lack of funds available at that time. He then sued on grounds that he had been deprived of his property without just compensation as required by law; however, his claim was rejected by both lower courts before reaching the Supreme Court where it met with similar fate despite arguments presented by counsel on behalf of Caldwell's company regarding breach of contract and violation of constitutional rights related thereto. Ultimately, Chief Justice Taney ruled against him citing precedent which held that Congress could not be compelled to pay money out its treasury unless specifically authorized by statute or appropriation act passed prior to any such obligation being incurred - something which did not exist here given no such authorization had been made when original agreement was entered into between parties involved in this case

In the dissenting opinion of Edmund B. Caldwell, surviving partner of James Lynd, Jr. and Company v The United States, Justice Daniel argued that the Court should have found in favor of the plaintiff because it was clear from both parties’ arguments that Congress had intended to exempt certain types of goods from import duties when they passed their legislation in 1846. He noted that while there were some ambiguities present within the language used by Congress, this ambiguity did not negate their intent to provide an exemption for certain items like those imported by Caldwell's company. Furthermore, he argued that if a literal interpretation was applied then it would lead to absurd results which could not have been what Congress intended when passing their law. As such he concluded his dissent with a call for judicial restraint and respect for legislative intent as opposed to strict adherence to statutory language alone.