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In the 1977 case of Califano v. Jobst, the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). The case involved a challenge to Social Security regulations that terminated benefits for disabled dependents upon marriage unless their spouse was also eligible for certain social security benefits. The respondent, Mark Jobst, who had been receiving disability insurance as a dependent child under his father's coverage since he was diagnosed with muscular dystrophy at age five, lost his benefits when he married Nanette Kuharik-Jobst - another disabled individual not entitled to Social Security Benefits. He argued this rule violated equal protection principles by discriminating against those who marry non-beneficiaries. The court held that it is permissible for Congress to enact laws which are rationally related to legitimate government interests; here being administrative efficiency and preserving fiscal integrity of social security system. It found no violation because these rules were not intended or did not operate against any particular group but rather served legitimate governmental objectives.
In the dissenting opinion for Califano v. Jobst, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the Social Security Act's provision terminating dependent child benefits upon marriage was discriminatory against disabled individuals. He believed that this rule unfairly assumed all marriages create an economic unit capable of supporting a disabled spouse, which is not always true in reality. Furthermore, he contended that it contradicted another section of the same act allowing continued benefits if a dependent child marries someone also entitled to such payments - suggesting Congress recognized some marriages do not automatically provide financial security for disabled dependents. Therefore, Marshall concluded that this termination rule lacked rational basis and violated equal protection principles by treating similarly situated people differently without sufficient justification.