In the case of Call v. Palmer, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The petitioner, Call, had been convicted in a federal court of a crime and was serving a sentence in a state prison. He sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, arguing that his conviction was invalid because the federal court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's judgment. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for federal prisoners, not state prisoners. The Court's decision in Call v. Palmer established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners convicted in federal courts. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases and has become an important precedent in the area of federal-state relations.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Call v. Palmer, arguing that the majority had misapplied the law of Louisiana and misinterpreted a prior Supreme Court decision. He argued that under Louisiana law, a married woman was not allowed to own property separate from her husband's estate; thus, when Mrs. Palmer purchased land with money she inherited from her father, it became part of Mr. Palmer's estate upon their marriage and could not be sold without his consent or an order from a court of competent jurisdiction. Justice Field further contended that although there had been some confusion regarding this issue in previous cases decided by the Supreme Court, those decisions did not apply to this case because they were based on different facts than what was presented here - namely that Mrs. Palmer owned no property before marrying Mr. Palmer and therefore any property acquired after marriage would become part of his estate unless otherwise ordered by a court or agreed upon between them both as husband and wife.. In conclusion he stated: “The question is one which should have been determined according to settled principles established by long usage in Louisiana” rather than relying on precedent set elsewhere which may have little relevance to this particular situation at hand