CALTON v. UTAH was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1876. The case involved a dispute between the state of Utah and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) over the right of the Church to practice polygamy. The Church argued that the practice of polygamy was protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom. The state of Utah argued that polygamy was illegal under state law and that the Church had no right to practice it. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state of Utah, holding that the practice of polygamy was not protected by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that polygamy was not a religious practice, but rather a form of marriage that was contrary to public policy. The Court also held that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the institution of marriage and that the practice of polygamy was detrimental to the public good. The Court further held that the state had the right to regulate the practice of polygamy and that the Church had no right to practice it. The decision in CALTON v. UTAH was significant in that it established the principle that the state has the right to regulate the practice of polygamy and that the First Amendment does not protect it. The decision also established the principle that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the institution of marriage and that the practice of polygamy is detrimental to the public good.

In the case of Calton v. Utah, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decision was wrongfully based on an interpretation of state law rather than federal constitutional law. He believed that this misinterpretation violated the Fourteenth Amendment and denied due process to those accused of crimes in Utah. According to Douglas, it is unconstitutional for states to deny defendants their right to counsel when they are facing criminal charges because it violates their right against self-incrimination as well as other rights guaranteed by the Constitution such as equal protection under the laws and due process of law. Furthermore, he argued that even if there were no explicit constitutional guarantees protecting these rights, denying them would still be unjustified since it deprives individuals from having adequate representation during trial proceedings which could lead to wrongful convictions or sentences being imposed upon innocent people who cannot afford legal assistance. In conclusion, Justice Douglas concluded his dissent by stating that “the Court should not permit States so easily and readily [to] deprive persons charged with crime[s]…of basic human liberties."