The U.S. Supreme Court case Camden and Suburban Railway Company v. Stetson in 1899 revolved around the issue of whether a state law could interfere with interstate commerce by imposing restrictions on bridge construction over navigable waters, which are under federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Camden and Suburban Railway Company, argued that it had been granted permission to build a drawbridge across Cooper River by New Jersey's legislature but was being hindered due to an injunction obtained by defendant Stetson who claimed the proposed bridge would obstruct navigation. The court ruled in favor of the railway company stating that while states have authority over their internal affairs, they cannot impede or control matters related to interstate commerce such as navigability of waterways for trade purposes; this falls within federal purview according to Commerce Clause of Constitution (Article I Section 8). Therefore, any state legislation conflicting with these principles is void.

In the dissenting opinion for Camden and Suburban Railway Company v. Stetson, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established principles of law regarding municipal corporations. He contended that municipalities should not be held liable for damages caused by public improvements unless it can be proven they acted negligently or outside their lawful authority. In this case, he believed there was no evidence to suggest either scenario had occurred when the city authorized construction of an elevated railway track which subsequently devalued Mr. Stetson’s property due to noise and vibration disturbances. Furthermore, Harlan asserted that if every change in street grade or other public improvement gave rise to claims for damages by nearby property owners, it would severely limit cities' ability to make necessary infrastructure changes without facing financial ruin from lawsuits.