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20-601 CAMERON V. EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL CENTER DECISION BELOW: 831 Fed.Appx. 748 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 3/29/2021 QUESTION PRESENTED: Through more than two years of litigation, the Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services led the Commonwealth’s legal defense of its law prohibiting abortions in which an unborn child is dismembered while still alive. While this matter was pending before the Sixth Circuit, the Secretary retained lawyers from the Kentucky Attorney General’s office to represent him. After the Sixth Circuit upheld the permanent injunction against Kentucky’s law by a divided vote, the Secretary decided not to appeal further. As allowed by Kentucky law, Attorney General Daniel Cameron promptly filed a motion to intervene to pick up the defense of Kentucky’s law where the Secretary had left off. Over a dissent, the Sixth Circuit refused to allow the Attorney General to defend Kentucky law. The Attorney General, the majority held, should have moved to intervene earlier, even though his office had been representing the Secretary. Five days later, this Court decided June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). The Attorney General raised June Medical in a timely petition for rehearing, arguing that it undercuts the panel’s decision to invalidate Kentucky’s law. Again over a dissent, the majority refused to allow the Attorney General’s petition even to be filed. The questions presented are: Whether a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law should be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law. And if so, whether the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for further consideration in light of June Medical. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 19-5516
In Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., the Supreme Court of the United States considered a Kentucky law that required abortion providers to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and mandated that abortions be performed in ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs). The court held that this law was unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on women seeking abortions without providing any medical benefits to them or their fetuses. Furthermore, the court found that there were other less restrictive means available for protecting women’s health during abortion procedures than those imposed by the state legislature in this case. In its decision, the majority opinion stated: “The burdens [of these requirements] are substantial; they constitute an undue burden on a woman’s constitutional right to choose." This ruling reaffirms previous decisions from lower courts which had also struck down similar laws as unconstitutional due to their imposition of an undue burden on women seeking abortions without providing any medical benefit whatsoever.
In the case of Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a Kentucky law requiring abortion clinics to have written transfer agreements with a hospital and ambulance service was constitutional. The majority opinion held that the law was constitutional, but Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Breyer argued that the law was unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on women seeking abortions. He argued that the law was not necessary to protect women’s health, as the majority opinion claimed, because the state already had laws in place to ensure that women received proper medical care in the event of an emergency. He also argued that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as the majority opinion claimed, because it imposed a burden on women seeking abortions without any evidence that it would actually improve women’s health. Justice Breyer concluded that the law was unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on women seeking abortions without any evidence that it would actually improve women’s health. He argued that the law was not necessary to protect women’s health and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. He concluded that the law should be struck down as unconstitutional.