In Camp v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a federal court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a military prison. The petitioner, Camp, was a soldier who had been convicted by a military court-martial of desertion and sentenced to two years of hard labor. He argued that the military court-martial did not have jurisdiction to try him, and that he should have been tried in a civil court. The Supreme Court held that the federal court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Camp. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a civil remedy, and that the military court-martial had exclusive jurisdiction over Camp's case. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was not available to challenge the jurisdiction of a military court-martial. The Court's decision in Camp v. United States established that the writ of habeas corpus was not available to challenge the jurisdiction of a military court-martial. The decision also reaffirmed the principle that the military court-martial system had exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving members of the military.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Camp v. United States, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both law and justice. He argued that Congress had no authority to pass a statute which would allow for an individual who has been convicted of a crime to be tried again on the same charge after being acquitted by a jury. Justice Field further stated that such action would violate due process and double jeopardy protections under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, as well as other laws passed by Congress regarding criminal procedure. Additionally, he noted that allowing individuals to be retried after acquittal could lead to oppressive practices against those accused of crimes since they could face multiple trials with different outcomes each time until one is reached where they are found guilty. Finally, Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating that if Congress wished for individuals who have been acquitted of certain offenses still be held accountable then it should do so through legislation rather than judicial interpretation or executive action.