In the case of Cargill, Inc., et al. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 1986, Monfort sued to prevent a merger between Excel Corporation and Spencer Beef on grounds that it would violate antitrust laws by reducing competition in the boxed beef market. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Cargill and Excel, stating that potential loss or damage due to increased competition does not constitute "antitrust injury" necessary for standing under Clayton Act Section 16 which provides for injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage by violation of antitrust laws. The court held that allowing companies to sue competitors solely because mergers might create more effective rivals would discourage beneficial competition and contradict basic principles of antitrust law.

In the dissenting opinion for Cargill, Inc., et al. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous antitrust laws and could potentially harm competition in the marketplace. He believed that a company should not have to prove it would be driven out of business by a merger to challenge it under Section 7 of the Clayton Act; instead, he suggested that any reasonable probability of substantial competitive injury should suffice as grounds for such a challenge. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "antitrust injury," arguing that they had defined it too narrowly and failed to consider other potential harms to competition beyond price-fixing or market allocation schemes. In his view, this restrictive definition ignored broader concerns about economic concentration and reduced consumer choice which are central tenets of antitrust law.